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This study examines the economic consequences of the anti-corruption campaign 
in China from the perspective of information risk. Using accruals quality as a proxy for 
information risk, we find that firms with terminated political connection brought about by the 
anti-corruption campaign, as compared to propensity-score-matched control firms, have lower 
information risk as represented by higher innate accruals quality. Employing a difference-in-
differences approach to investigate the economic effects of the campaign, we further note that 
firms with resigned directors are associated with lower cost of equity. The evidence is 
consistent with the proposition that the anti-corruption campaign has lowered the information 
risk through an improvement in the operating environment of these impacted firms upon the 
resignation of connected officials. Further evidence suggests that, for an increase in 
information risk, the demand for a higher risk premium is more pronounced for firms with 
terminated connection due to the anti-corruption campaign than firms with no connection. 






 Guanxi, as an essential and defining element of Chinese culture, is considered a 
key determinant of a firm’s performance and growth in the Chinese business world (Gold et al. 
2002; Luo 2020). Both local and foreign firms are bound to face the dynamics of guanxi in 
their business dealings in China. Under the changing economic, legal and institutional 
landscapes in China, the line between guanxi and corruption can be a very fine one (Dunfee 
and Warren 2001). As an example, JP Morgan Chase was being investigated by US authorities 
after media reports suggested the bank hired sons and daughters of senior Chinese officials in 
the hope of winning deals from major state-owned enterprises.1 As part of the plan to raise the 
standard of corporate governance of local firms, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) issued, in August 2001, the Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of an Independent 
Director System in Companies Listed in China. 2  All companies listed on Chinese Stock 
Exchanges are required to have at least one third of their board members as independent 
directors by 2003. However, with the widespread practice of rent-seeking behaviors via 
political connection, these independent directorships in listed companies were often taken up 
by government officials. 
 The economic and financial impacts of political connection have been examined 
extensively. In particular, politically connected firms are associated with higher firm value and 
performance (Claessens et al. 2008; Goldman et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2012), easier access to 
external finance (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Cleassens et al. 2008; Li et al. 2008; Houston 
et al. 2014; Piotroski and Zhang 2014) and enjoy a lower cost of equity capital (Boubakri et al. 
2012). However, limited studies are available on the effects of the termination of political 
connection. In this paper, we use the anti-corruption campaign in China as a pseudo-natural 
 
1 South China Morning Post, 18 August 2013. 
2  http:// http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/ssgs/gszl/201012/t20101231_189696.html (original 
in Chinese; accessed 3 September 2020). 
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experiment to investigate the financial impacts and economic consequences of the campaign 
on political connected as well as corrupt firms. As pointed out by Pan and Tian (2020), existing 
studies usually focus on the comparison of economic outcomes between firms with or without 
political connection, and it is unclear as to how these economic outcomes respond to a change 
in political connections through an ousted or arrested corrupt officials. The present study aims 
to address this gap by utilizing the anti-corruption campaign as an exogenous shock and using 
a difference-in-differences (DiD) design to compare the effects of losing political connection 
on cost of equity for firms affected by the campaign to a propensity-score-matched (PSM) 
control group. Specifically, our evidence suggests that firms with political connection 
terminated by the anti-corruption campaign are associated with higher reporting quality as 
proxied by acrruals quality and a lower cost of equity arising from the consequential lower 
information risk, as compared to firms with no political connections.  
 This study is related and contributes to a growing body of literature studying the 
impacts of the anti-corruption campaign on politically connected or corruption-related firms. 
For example, studies like Chen et al. (2018), Ding et al. (2020) and Lin et al. (2020) examine 
how the anti-corruption campaign affects China’s capital markets and document a general 
increase in shareholder value overall as well as a drop in stock price crash risk of local firms. 
Focusing exclusively on firms with politically connected directors, both Jin et al. (2019) and 
Wang et al. (2018) report a drop in sales and profitability of impacted firms, while Hope et al. 
(2020) find apparent lower accrual and real earnings management activities by firms impacted 
by anti-corruption campaign as compared to firms with no political connection.  
Our study relates to and complements prior studies by (i) investigating the effects 
of the anti-corruption campaign on the business and reporting environment of the affected firms 
(intrinsic business factors), (ii) the (less) opaqueness in the firms’ discretionary disclosure 
policies, and consequently (iii)  the pricing effects (reduced cost of equity) due to potential 
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changes in the information risks that are driven by the firm-specific operating and 
environmental characteristics as well as discretionary managerial decisions. Similar to Francis 
et al. (2004; 2005) we use the firms’ accruals (reporting) quality (AQ) as proxy for information 
risk as determined by both management’s short-term reporting choices and long-term strategic 
decisions. Kim and Qi (2010) provide further evidence that AQ and its pricing effect vary 
systematically with business cycles and macroeconomics. Likewise, we find consistent 
evidence that firms with termination of political connection brought about by the anti-
corruption campaign are associated with higher innate accruals quality, supporting the 
proposition that the campaign improves the operating environment of these firms upon the 
resignation of connected officials. 
Our findings are also relevant to policymakers and regulators of anti-corruption 
campaign. Previous studies indicate that corruption has a negative impact on overall economic 
growth and firm performance (Mo 2001; Murphy et al. 1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). The 
anti-corruption campaign initiated by President Xi has led to widespread investigation of 
corrupt officials, and according to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) 
of the Communist Party of China (CPC), more than one million officials have been punished 
for corruption between 2013 to 2016.3 While the anti-corruption campaign may reduce the 
number of politically connected firms in China, our findings indicate that an economic 
consequence of the campaign is the investors’ attachment of a penalty in the form of a higher 
risk premium on these impacted firms, as compared to firms with no connection, for a given 
decrease in the accruals quality of both types of firms.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
institutional background as well as the impact of anti-corruption campaign. In section 3, we 
detailed our sample identification and selection process following by an explanation of our 
 
3  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-37748241 (accessed 3 September 2020). 
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research design. Our main findings are presented in section 4, and a conclusion is drawn in 
section 5. 
  
2. Institutional background and impact of anti-corruption campaign 
2.1 Institutional background 
Guanxi, as a form of social capital, is referring to the concept of drawing on social 
connections in order to secure favors (rent-seeking) in personal relations and has been an 
integral part of the Chinese business world for the last few centuries (Gold et al. 2002; Luo 
2020). A company possessing better guanxi connections with the business community and 
governmental authorities may gain an edge over its competitors.4 Prior research indicates that 
firms with political connections in China are associated with higher amount of government 
subsidies (Wu et al. 2012a); more tax benefits (Wu et al. 2012b; Lin et al. 2018); easier access 
to external debt financing (Cull et al. 2015; Wang 2015); higher likelihood of completing cross-
border M&A deals (Schweizer et al. 2019), etc. Based on statistics from the Wind financial 
database, politically connected directors account for 7.82% of independent directorships in the 
Chinese A-share market at the end of 2012.5  
While guanxi is not necessarily an origin or a source of corrupt practices, studies 
(e.g., Luo 2008; Ngo 2008; Zhan 2012) suggest that the corruption-facilitating effects of guanxi 
network as well as the intertwining nature of rent-seeking and corruption. As an example, Zhan 
(2012) reckons that guanxi network provides undocumented, exclusive, and safe channels of 
communication for officials to disclose crucial information in exchange of benefits. Guanxi 
network also enables corrupt exchanges between those privileged and underprivileged in an 
 
4  Even though networking is also common in Western economies, Luo (2020) points out that guanxi is a network 
based on favor exchange in which nothing is specified and interests are not necessarily mutual, whereas Western 
networking is based on benefit exchange in which each party’s commitment, contributions, and obligations are 
stipulated and the strategic goals of the relevant parties are compatible. 
5  http://lib.cet.com.cn/paper/szb_con/319900.html (original in Chinese; accessed on 29 August 2020). 
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economy that is weak in open and fair distribution and exchange of resources. Finally, guanxi 
network can distort officials’ norms and induce them to particularistic behaviors. When such 
norms override the legal norms, officials may feel obliged and justified to engage in corrupt 
activities.  
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published annually by 
Transparency International, China was ranked 80th among 176 and 177 countries with a score 
of 39/100 and 40/100 in 2012 and 2013 respectively. However, China’s ranking on the CPI 
dropped to 100th out of 198 countries in 2014 with a score of 36/100.6  In 2006, the CCDI made 
the combat against business bribery the main focus of anti-corruption campaign. In late 2012, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping took office and promised to root out graft among "tigers" and 
"flies". In the year 2013 alone, 51,306 officials and 37,551 cases were investigated for work-
related crimes including bribery and embezzlement.7 As part of President Xi’s anti-corruption 
campaign, the Central Organization Department of the CPC launched “Rule 18” on October 
19, 20138 and banned all government officials to work concurrently in enterprises. Government 
officials who serve as directors in enterprises with the permission of the Central Organization 
Department are not allowed to receive any form of remuneration. Resigned government 
officials are not allowed, within three years, to work in enterprises under the same jurisdiction 
location of the retried officials. The release of Rule 18 resulted in a wave of resignations of 
bureaucrat directors9 and it provides a potential setting for us to investigate the economic 
impacts of reporting consequences of Rule 18 at the firm level. The rule potentially provide an 
exogenous shock and impacts only a group of rent-seeking firms through political connection 
 
6 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (accessed 3 September 2020). 
7 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2014-03/14/content_17347170.htm (accessed 29 August 2020).  
8 The full title of “Rule 18” is “Regarding the opinion on the regulation of Party leaders holding part- (full-) time 
positions in enterprises”. More details of “Rule 18” can be found, in Chinese, at the official website of the 
Central Organization Department: http://news.12371.cn/2013/10/30/ARTI1383137348428870.shtml. 
9 http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/jjckb.xinhuanet.com/2014-06/17/content_508963.htm (original in Chinese; 
accessed on 30 August 2020). 
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or corruption. The implementation of Rule 18 allows us to unambiguously identify treatment 
and control firms to develop a DiD research design to investigate the differential effects of the 
anti-corruption campaign on the sample firms. 
 
2.2 Impact of anti-corruption campaign 
There is a growing body of literature in recent years that examines and finds mixed 
reactions in firms’ financial and performance to the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. Hope et al. 
(2020) examine the level of discretionary accruals of firms that lose official directors due to 
the enactment of Rule 18 and find that the earnings management behaviors of these firms are 
lower when compared with other firms. Additional evidence suggests that the impact of the 
anti-corruption campaign on earnings management is dependent on institutional factors such 
as the degree of development of the financial markets, judicial efficiency, state-ownership, and 
preferential access to financing. Empirical results from Kong et al. (2020) suggest that anti-
corruption campaign substantially increases the total factor productivity of individual firms by 
1.7% and that the positive impact is more pronounced in non-state owned enterprises, firms 
without political connections, and firms located in areas with weak legal environment. Their 
findings are consistent with the suggestions that both the rent-seeking and lubricant effect of 
corruption are relatively weak for state-owned enterprises and firms with political connections. 
Furthermore, the campaign increases the sensitivity of firm investment to investment 
opportunities and promotes firm innovation. 
On the other hand, Wei et al. (2020) document that the disruption of political 
connections due to the release of Rule 18 is associated with higher labour costs as well as 
employee turnover of the affected firms. In assessing the impact of the Eight-Point Regulation10 
 
10 The Eight-Point Regulation was issued by the Central Organization Department on 4 December 2012 with the 
aim of reducing bureaucracy, extravagance and undesirable work practices among CPC members. 
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under the anti-corruption campaign, Jin et al. (2019) notice that the sales revenue of politically 
connected firms dropped significantly after the introduction of the rule. Using Tobin’s Q as a 
proxy for firm value, Xu (2018) finds that the implementation of Rule 18 impedes value of 
firms with banned directors by 4% on average. Further tests reveal that such decrease in firm 
value is due to the loss of political connections and disincentive for impacted managers and 
government officers. Based on 29 high-level anti-corruption cases in China from 2005 to 2011, 
Liu et al. (2016) investigate the merger and acquisition performance of corruption-related firms 
before and after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats. Their evidence shows that the post-M&A 
performance of corruption-related firms, as measured by the short-term cumulative abnormal 
returns around announcement date and long-term buy-and-hold returns, is significantly worse 
than that of the unrelated firms subsequent to the arrest of the corrupt government officials. 
Similarly, Wang et al. (2018) identifies 20 cases of politician dismissal during China's anti-
corruption campaign since 2012 and observes that the termination of political connections 
results in a 2% decline in equity value for affiliated firms at the point of event. Such line of 
inqueries generally suggest negative market reactions as a result of decreased profitability of 
the affected firms due to the termination of political connections. 
Most of the studies on the impacts of the anti-corruption campaign focus on one 
aspect of the firms’ reporting and/or financial performance while teasing out the differential 
effects as regards to the firms’ specific geographic, operating or governance characteristics. 
With the removal of corrupt officials or termination of political connection, impacted firms are 
no longer able to enjoy preferential treatments from governments and are likely to face higher 
operating costs. On the other hand, anti-corruption campaign helps to restore a level playing 
field amongst competitors and may lead to lower transaction costs for these firms. The overall 
results as reported by prevailing literature are generally inconsistent.  
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To buttress our understanding of the effects resulting from the implementation of 
Rule 18, we adopt a more holistic approach by assessing the reporting environment of the 
affected firms.  Specifically, we evaluate firms’ reporting quality as proxied by their accruals 
quality.  Following the arguments of Easley and O’Hara (2004) and Francis, et al (2004), if a 
firm’s reporting quality deteriorates (an increase in accruals quality), it impedes the uninformed 
investors’ ability to hedge against private information advantage available to informed 
investors. Such increase in the “information risks” of the firm will consequently increase the 
cost of equity to compensate the uninformed investors.  Investor private information includes 
both the firm’s business model and operating environment (innate factors) as well as 
management’s propensity to strategic (discretionary) choice of reporting policies. 
 
3. Sample formation and research design 
3.1 Sample formation 
3.1.1 Sample, treatment, and control firms 
Our sample includes all non-financial firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges from 2011 to 2015. To test the effects of the anti-corruption campaign, we 
construct a pre-Rule 18 (2011–2012) and a post-Rule 18 (2014–2015) period. Rule-18 affects 
two types of “connected” firms, namely, politically connected firms with director(s) resigned 
due to the release of Rule 18 (the “ConResigned firms”), and firms with officers involved in 
corruption cases in the post-Rule 18 period (the “Corrupt firms”).  
Similar to prior studies on politically connected firms (e.g. Lee and Wang 2017, 
Wu et al. 2012b, etc.), a firm is classified as politically connected if either the CEO or any 
director was currently or formerly an officer, before 19 October 2013, of either: government 
official, member of the Chinese People’s Congress, member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, or military official. ConResigned firms are defined as those in which 
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all politically connected CEOs or directors within a firm have resigned due to the release of 
Rule 18 and they will be included in the treatment group. For this purpose, we review the 
announcements of listed companies from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database to determine the reasons for their directors’ resignations. Moreover, firms 
with independent directors from academia are not considered to be politically connected as 
they tend not to have any direct political influence in general. Likewise, a firm is classified as 
Corrupt when any of its officers are involved in reported corruption cases in the post-Rule 18 
period. Such corruption cases are to be identified from official sources, e.g. the Excerpts of 
Disciplinary Cases of the CPC published by the CCDI, The Law Yearbook of China, as well 
as unofficial sources, e.g. newspapers and internet. Similar to Hope et al. (2020), we construct 
corresponding control groups with Non-Connected firms for the ConResigned and Corrupt 
treatment groups. Non-connected firms are classified as those in which there were no politically 
connected CEO or directors in both pre- and post-Rule 18 periods.  
 
3.1.2 Propensity-score estimation and matching 
The control samples are generated by the propensity-score matching (PSM) 
approach such that the treatment firms and control firms share, other than the test variables, 
similar operating, performance and governance characteristics. The matching process helps to 
mitigate bias due to omitted and confounding variables (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Similar 
to Hope et al. (2020) and Xu (2018), fitted values of the annual logit regressions on the 
treatment groups and the Non-connected group provide estimates of the probability (propensity 
scores) of firms being affected by Rule 18 (i.e., whether a particular firm has politically 
connected or corrupt directors). We include a generous set of control variables in the logistic 
estimates. This include all independent variables in analyses to be decribed in the ensuing 
sections as well as other firm and governance characteristics that may influence the 
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appointment of independent directors with political background. The logit model and the 
estimated results are presented in Appendix C. Separate control firms with no political 
connections (Non-connected) are matched without replacement by year, industry and the 
propensity scores with firms from the two treatment groups: ConResigned and Corrupt.  
 
3.2 Research design 
3.2.1 Impact of Rule 18 on Information Risk 
Theoretical research by Easley and O’Hara (2004) and Lambert et al. (2007) 
indicates that information risk is a non-diversifiable risk factor and conjecture a positive 
relation between information risk and costs of capital. Information risk concerns the uncertainty 
or imprecision of information that is relevant to investors for pricing securities. Following 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005), we define AQ as the extent to which the 
accrual component of earnings is able to map earnings to information about cash flows. 
Assuming cash flow as the primary element that investors price, accruals shift or adjust the 
timing of accounting recognition to match with the timing of economic impacts of business 
transactions, resulting in an earnings number that better measure firm performance. However, 
accruals are subject to assumptions and estimates, and such estimation errors and noise reduce 
the beneficial role of accruals. Therefore, AQ provides information on the mapping of 
accounting earnings into cash flows and is viewed as a proxy for information risk. Sources of 
this risk is driven by innate features of the firm’s characteristics, business model and operating 
environment, and poor accruals quality that is subject to discretionary management choice of 
accounting policies, implementation decisions, and managerial error (Francis et al. 2004; 2005). 
Guay et al. (1996) suggests that the discretionary component of accruals quality includes 1) the 
performance subcomponent, which reflects management’s attempts to enhance the ability of 
earnings to reflect performance in a reliable and timely way; 2) the opportunism subcomponent, 
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which are employed to hide poor performance or postpone a portion of unusually good current 
earnings to future years; and 3) the noise subcomponent. 
As point out under Section 2.2, studies on the impact of anti-corruption campaign 
on individual firms have so far generated mixed results. On the one hand, one would expect a 
downturn in the operating environment of firms with the discontinuation of favorable 
government subsidies and tax benefits following the termination of political connection or the 
arrest of corrupt officials. With higher complexity of transactions and unpredictability of the 
firms’ environment, estimation errors of accruals will be higher (and thus lower innate 
component of AQ) and investors will find it harder to extract precise public information about 
the firm performance (higher information risk). On the other hand, anti-corruption campaign 
tends to reduce rent-seeking opportunities, reconstruct fair market competition, correct 
distorted investment incentives, reduce transaction costs, and restore formal and efficient 
institutions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Giannetti et al., 2020). Impacted firms 
may face a better or more stable operating environment. With accruals being able to provide a 
better mapping of earnings to cash flows (higher innate component of AQ), investors will find 
the earnings number to be more precise and informative (lower information risk). Taken 
together, we argue that the economic impact of Rule 18 on AQ remains an empirical issue.  
To explore the impact of Rule 18 on information risk of ConResigned and Corrupt 
firms, we first conduct univariate tests by comparing the mean of various innate factors and 
measurements of firms’ operating environments that are commonly found in the literature 
between pre- and post-Rule 18 periods for these two treatment groups. This is followed by 
regression of the following multivariate empirical models for both periods: 
   
 AQj,t = β0 + β1CONRESIGNj,t + β2Sizej,t + β3OperCyclej,t + β4NegEarn%j,t + 
β5ϭ(CFO)j,t + β6ϭ(Sales)j,t + β7ϭ(Returns)j,t + β8ϭ(Volume)j,t + β9Betaj,t + (1) 
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β10Leveragej,t + β11ROAj,t + β12Returnsj,t + β13Tangibilityj,t + β14GDPGrowthj,t + 
β15FirmGrowthj,t + β16 ϭ(NI)j,t + β17MarketSharej,t + β18Listingj,t + β19Analystsj,t + 
β20StateHoldingsj,t + β21InsiderHoldingsj,t + β22MajorHoldingsj,t + 
β23InstituteHoldingsj,t + εj,t. 
 
 AQj,t = β0 + β1CORRUPTj,t + β2Sizej,t + β3OperCyclej,t + β4NegEarn%j,t + 
 β5ϭ(CFO)j,t + β6ϭ(Sales)j,t + β7ϭ(Returns)j,t + β8ϭ(Volume)j,t + β9Betaj,t + 
β10Leveragej,t + β11ROAj,t + β12Returnsj,t + β13Tangibilityj,t + β14GDPGrowthj,t + 
β15FirmGrowthj,t + β16 ϭ(NI)j,t + β17MarketSharej,t + β18Listingj,t + β19Analystsj,t + 
β20StateHoldingsj,t + β21InsiderHoldingsj,t + β22MajorHoldingsj,t + 
β23InstituteHoldingsj,t + εj,t. (2) 
 
We employ three sets of proxies for information risk: AQ-DD, AQ-FLOS and AQ-
MJ which are based on firm-level AQ as developed in Dechow and Dichev (2002), Francis et 
al. (2005), and the Modified-Jones model as developed in Dechow et al. (1995) respectively. 
We also decompose AQ into the innate component (InnateAQ) and the discretionary 
component (AbDisAQ) for each of the AQ proxies.11 In model (1), CONRESIGN is a dummy 
variable which takes on the value of one if the individual firm was politically connected and 
have all the chief executive officers and directors resigned due to the release of Rule-18, and 
zero otherwise. In model (2), CORRUPT is a dummy variable which takes on the value of one 
if an officer of the firm was involved in corruption cases after the release of Rule-18, and zero 
otherwise. We then include 4 sets of variables that the literature (Dechow and Dichev 2002; 
Francis et al. 2005; Kent et al. 2010) has shown to be associated with firms’ information risk 
 
11  Following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005), we identified several summary indicators of 
firm’s operating environment or business model (firm size, standard deviation of cash flows, standard 
deviation of revenues, length of operating cycle, and frequency of negative earnings realizations) and apply 
the fitted values from annual regressions of AQ on these summary indicators as the measure of the innate 
portion of AQ (InnateAQ); the residual is used as the measure of discretionary AQ (AbDisAQ). Details of the 
empirical estimation model are presented under Appendix B.  
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as control variables: (i) innate controls: firm size (Size), length of operating cycle (OperCycle), 
incidence of negative earnings (NegEarn%), volatility of operating cash flow (ϭ(CFO)), and 
volatility of sales (ϭ(Sales));12 (ii) volatility controls: volatility of returns (ϭ(Returns)) and 
volatility of shares’ trading volume (ϭ(Volume)); (iii) financial controls: long-term debt 
(Leverage), return on assets (ROA), rate of returns (Returns), systematic risk (Beta), asset 
tangibility (Tangibility), market share (MarketShare), effects of macroeconomic environment 
on firm’s information risk (GDPGrowth), firm growth (FirmGrowth) and volatility of net 
income (ϭ(NI)); and (iv) governance controls: number of listing years (Listing), analyst 
following (Analysts), state shareholdings (StateHoldings), insider’s shareholdings 
(InsiderHoldings), major shareholdings (MajorHoldings) and institute’s shareholdings 
(InstituteHoldings). Our main variables of interest will be the coefficients β1 of the term 
CONRESIGN and β1 of the term CORRUPT, under model (1) and (2) respectively, which 
measure the main effect of anti-corruption campaign on the information risk of the treatment 
groups, i.e., ConResigned and Corrupt firms, for pre- and post-Rule 18 periods relative to their 
control groups, i.e., Non-Connect firms. Definitions of the variables mentioned above are 
included under Appendix A and the empirical models for the three information risk proxies are 
detailed under Appendix B. Financial data for the above variables is extracted from the 
CSMAR database. 
 
3.2.2 Economic consequences of Rule 18  
Francis et al. (2004; 2005) show that poorer AQ is associated with higher cost of 
equity capital and the result is consistent with the view that information risk is a priced risk 
factor. As explained under section 3.2.1, AQ is driven by innate features of the firm’s business 
 
12  When InnateAQ and AbDisAQ are used as the dependent variable for both models (1) and (2), innate controls 
except Size will be excluded from the regression models to avoid possible multicollinearity problem.  
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model and operating environment, and poor accruals quality that is subject to discretionary 
management choice of accounting policies, implementation decisions, and managerial error. In 
the latter’s case, managers’ attempts to use discretion over accruals to improve the mapping of 
earnings to cash flows as a performance indicator will reduce the information asymmetry that 
gives rise to undiversifiable information risk, leading to lower information risk premium 
demanded by investors. When managerial discretion is used to reap opportunistic gains by 
deliberate choice of opaque reporting policies, such behaviors are expected to increase 
information uncertainty and, therefore, leading to higher risk premium demanded by investors. 
Consequently, discretionary accruals quality is expected to have cost of capital effects that 
reflect some mixture of performance improvement (which will offset the cost of capital 
increases associated with innate accruals quality factors) and opportunism plus noise (which 
will exacerbate these factors). Similar to Francis et al. (2005), we do not attempt to separate 
these effects because testing for opportunistic behaviors affecting discretionary accruals quality 
would require the use of targeted, idiosyncratic samples chosen to enhance the effects of 
specific incentives to behave opportunistically. To the extent that the anti-corruption campaign 
would lead to higher (lower) information risk for ConResigned or Corrupt firms, we would 
expect a higher (lower) risk premium demanded by investors. 
Our DiD analysis on the impact of Rule 18 on the cost of equity capital (CoE) of 
treatment groups as compared to PSM control groups are based on the following regression 
models in both Pre- and Post-Rule 18 periods: 
   
 CoEj,t = β0 + β1AQj,t + β2CONRESIGNj,t + β3CONRESIGNj,t x AQj,t + 
β4Sizej,t + β5OperCyclej,t + β6NegEarn%j,t + β7ϭ(CFO)j,t + β8ϭ(Sales)j,t +  
β9ϭ(Returns)j,t + β10ϭ(Volume)j,t + β11Leveragej,t + β12Betaj,t +  





CoEj,t = β0 + β1AQj,t + β2CORRUPTj,t + β3CORRUPTj,t x AQj,t + 
β4Sizej,t + β5OperCyclej,t + β6NegEarn%j,t + β7ϭ(CFO)j,t + β8ϭ(Sales)j,t +  
β9ϭ(Returns)j,t + β10ϭ(Volume)j,t + β11Leveragej,t + β12Betaj,t +  
+ β13FirmGrowthj,t + β14GDPGrowthj,t + εj,t (4) 
 
In both models (3) and (4), we use individual firm’s industry-adjusted earnings to 
price ratio (IndEP) as a proxy for its CoE. The price-earnings ratio, which places a price on a 
dollar of earnings, is considered an inverse indicator of the cost of equity (Liu et al. 2002). A 
lower (higher) amount that investors are willing to pay for a dollar of earnings represents a 
higher (lower) cost of equity capital for firms. IndEP is calculated as the difference between 
individual firm’s earnings to price ratio and that of its median industry. Similar to models (1) 
and (2), we employ three sets of proxies for AQ: AQ-DD, AQ-FLOS and AQ-MJ together with 
their InnateAQ and AbDisAQ components. In model (3), CONRESIGN is a dummy variable 
which takes on the value of one if the individual firm was politically connected and have all 
the CEO and directors resigned due to the release of Rule-18, and zero otherwise. In model (4), 
CORRUPT is a dummy variable which takes on the value of one if an officer of the firm was 
involved in corruption cases after the release of Rule-18, and zero otherwise.  POST is a dummy 
variable and takes on the value of one when the year is falling under the post-Rule 18 period, 
and zero otherwise. Following prior literature examining CoE, we include 2 sets of controls: (i) 
innate controls: 13  Size, OperCycle, NegEarn%, ϭ(CFO), ϭ(Sales); (ii) volatility controls: 
ϭ(Returns), ϭ(Volume); and (iii) financial controls: Leverage, Beta, FirmGrowth and 
GDPGrowth. Definitions of the above variables are listeded under Appendix A. Financial data 
for the above variables is extracted from the CSMAR database.  
 
13  When InnateAQ and AbDisAQ are used as the dependent variable for both models (3) and (4), innate controls 
except Size will be excluded from the regression models to avoid possible multicollinearity problem. 
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In model (3) and (4), the coefficients β2 measure the incremental change in CoE 
for the treatment groups, i.e., ConResigned and Corrupt firms, in the pre- and post-Rule 18 
period relative to their control groups, i.e., Non-Connected firms, respectively. For a unit 
increase in the rank of AQ, the coefficient β3 captures the incremental change in CoE for 
ConResigned and Corrupt firms in the pre- and post-Rule 18 periods relative to Non-Connected 
firms respectively. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Derivation of sample and descriptive statistics 
 We start with all firms listed on both the Main and SME boards of the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. After excluding firms in the financial industry, we have a total 
of 2,051 firms on the date when Rule 18 was issued. Upon checking the background of the 
directors and available public records, 466 firms are found to be politically connected and 90 
firms have all their connected directors subsequently resigned.  19 firms are found to have 
officials involved in corrupt cases after the implementation of Rule 18. After eliminating firms 
with missing variables and winsorizing variables at 1% and 99% levels, our final treatment 
group of ConResigned (Corrupt) firms includes 82 (16) firms with 243 (46) firm-years. 
  Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our sample firms, partitioned into pre- 
and post-Rule 18 periods. The various measures of AQ, InnateAQ, and AbDisAQ have a mean 
larger than their respective median and are skewed to the right in both pre- and post-Rule 18 
periods. For example, the mean (median) values of AQ-DD, AQ-FLOS and AQ-MJ are 0.0442 
(0.0302), 0.0425 (0.0287) and 0.1610 (0.0958) respectively in the pre-Rule 18 period, and are 
0.0397 (0.0244), 0.0373 (0.0255) and 0.1504 (0.0726) respectively in the post-Rule 18 period. 
With their standard deviations fairly close to the mean values, the distributions of the three sets 
of AQ indicate a high level of variation. A further look into the distributions of various AQ 
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measures indicate that the estimates under the MJ model are distinctive from those under the 
FLOS and DD models. In the pre-Rule 18 period, AQ-MJ, InnateAQ-MJ and AbDisAQ-MJ 
have a mean of 0.1610, 0.3183 and 0.2318 respectively. However, AQ-DD (AQ-FLOS), 
InnateAQ-DD (InnateAQ-FLOS) and AbDisAQ-DD (AbDisAQ-FLOS) have a value of 0.0442 
(0.0425), 0.0517 (0.0531) and 0.0332 (0.0321) respectively. Similar pattern is observed in the 
post-Rule 18 period. As shown under Appendix B of this paper, AQ measures derived from the 
FLOS and DD models are limited to current accruals. Under the MJ model, AQ is related to the 
extent to which accruals are well captured by fitted values obtained by regressing total accruals 
on changes in revenues and property, plant and equipment. As pointed by Francis et al. (2005), 
while the MJ model identified accruals as abnormal if they are not explained by a limited set 
of fundamentals, the link to information risk is less direct than in the DD and FLOS approach.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 Several firm characteristics and innate controls exhibit variances between pre- and 
post-Rule 18 periods. FirmGrowth and returns, as an example, has a mean value of 0.1878 and 
-0.0021 in the pre-Rule 18 period but 0.2862 and 0.0019 in the post-Rule 18 period. NegEarn% 
has a mean of 0.0677 and 0.1050 in the pre- and post-Rule 18 periods respectively. On the 
other hand, variables like Leverage and Tangibility remain stable in both pre- and post-Rule 18 
periods, and their values are comparable to those found in prior studies, e.g., Hu et al. (2020). 
 
4.2 Univariate test for main variables and innate controls 
 Given the distributions of our main variables are skewed, we conduct a test on the 
differences of their medians between pre- and post-Rule 18 periods using the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test and the results are reported under Table 2. For ConResigned firms, all AQ measures 
under the DD (z = 2.130), FLOS (z = 2.237) and MJ (z = 2.905) models and their innate 
components are found to be significantly lower in the post-Rule 18 period, meaning that the 
overall information risk as well as the information risk arising from innate firm characteristics 
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have dropped after the launch of the anti-corruption campaign. Evidence from the test of 
median difference on innate factors is mixed: OperCycle and ϭ(Sales) has a z-score of -2.624 
and 2.720 respectively, meaning that ConResigned firms have experienced a longer operating 
cycle but lower volatility in sales. For Corrupt firms, only AQ-DD, AbDisAQ-DD and 
AbDisAQ-FLOS are found to be lower in the post-Rule 18 period, and they are associated with 
lower volatility in operating cash flows.  
 
4.3 Effect of Rule 18 on Information Risk  
 Table 3 provides our main results on the effect of Rule 18 on information risk of 
ConResigned and Corrupt firms (treatment groups) as compared to Non-Connected firms 
(control group). Panel A of Table 3 presents the regression results using decile ranks14 of AQ 
under the FLOS, DD and MJ models together with its two components, InnateAQ and AbDisAQ, 
for ConResigned firms as compared to Non-Connected firms. The coefficient for CONRESIGN 
is insignificant in both pre- and post-Rule 18 periods when AQ is measured under all three 
models. However, the coefficient for CONRESIGN has a significant value of -1.0986 (t-value 
= -3.09), -1.1024 (t-value = -3.05) and -0.7395 (t-value = -1.87) in the post-Rule 18 period 
when InnateAQ is measured under FLOS, DD and MJ models respectively. In other words, 
information risk of ConResigned firms has dropped in the post-Rule 18 period as compared to 
Non-Connected firms, and the result is consistent with the proposition that the anti-corruption 
campaign has lowered the information risk of ConResigned firms through an improvement in 
the operating environment of these firms upon the resignation of connected officials. For 
AbDisAQ, no significant results are noted under FLOS and DD models, but coefficient for 
CONRESIGN has a significant value of -0.8458 (t-value = -2.00) under the MJ model. Turning 
 
14  Following Francis et al. (2004) and Francis et al. (2005), we use decile ranks of the measures of AQ to control 
for outliers and non-linearities. 
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to (unreported) coefficients of control variables, we find that they exhibit signs that are 
generally consistent with prior studies, e.g., Cohen (2008), on attributes of AQ. Contrary to 
expectation, we find that Leverage is positively and significantly associated with AQ and its 
components across all models.  
  Panel B of Table 3 presents the regression results using decile ranks of AQ 
together with its two components, InnateAQ and AbDisAQ, under the FLOS, DD, and MJ 
models for Corrupt firms as compared to Non-Connected firms. No coefficient for the term 
CORRUPT is found to be significant in the post-Rule 18 period. Plausible explanations of the 
insignificant results include the relatively small number of observations and the measurement 
errors associated with corruption data. Prior studies, e.g., Fisman and Svensson (2007), Wang 
and You (2012), etc., have pointed out the secretive nature of corrupt transactions and it is 
difficult to pinpoint the exact window in which the corrupt transactions impact the firms. 
 
4.4 Effect of Rule 18 on Cost of Equity 
  Panel A of Table 4 presents the regression results of model (4) for ConResigned 
vs Non-Connected firms. Coefficients for CONRESIGN in the post-Rule 18 periods have a 
significant value of -0.0131 (t-value = 2.19) and -0.0111 (t-value = 1.88) when AQ and 
InnateAQ are respectively measured under the FLOS model. Similarly, CONRESIGN has a 
coefficient of -0.0140 (t-value = -2.33) and -0.0133 (t-value = -2.43) when AQ and InnateAQ 
are respectively measured under the DD model. No significant value is found for coefficient of 
CONRESIGN when AQ and InnateAQ are measured under the MJ model or when AbDisAQ is 
measured under any one of the FLOS, DD or MJ models. As pointed out earlier, the link to 
information risk is less direct for MJ measures than those under the DD and FLOS approach. 
Overall speaking, these results indicate that CONRESIGN firms have a lower cost of equity as 
compared to Non-Connected firms in the post-Rule 18 period, and are consistent with the 
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proposition that the anti-corruption campaign helps to create a stable and better operating 
environment by reducing rent-seeking opportunities, reconstructing fair market competition, 
correcting distorted investment incentives, reducing transaction costs, and restoring formal and 
efficient institutions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Giannetti et al., 2020), resulting 
in lower risk premium as demanded by investors.  
 In Panel A, coefficients for the cross-term CONRESIGN x AQ has a significant 
value of 0.0033 (t-value = 2.53) and 0.0026 (t-value = 2.43) when AQ and InnateAQ are 
measured under the FLOS model. Similar findings for the cross-term CONRESIGN x AQ are 
noted when AQ and InnateAQ are measured under the DD and MJ models. In other words, for 
a unit increase in the rank of AQ or InnateAQ, the rise in cost of equity is more pronounced for 
ConResigned firms as compared to Non-Connected firms in the post-Rule 18 period. 
Collectively, our findings indicate that investors require a higher cost of capital for 
ConResigned firms than Non-Connected firms when both are facing higher information risk. 
Correia (2014) finds that politically connected firms, on average, are less likely to be involved 
in enforcement actions by government authorities and face lower penalties imposed by an 
enforcement action. Termination of political connection brought by anti-corruption campaign 
increases the likelihood of restatements by ConResigned firms, resulting in higher information 
risk (Kravet and Shevlin, 2010). Our evidence is consistent with the argument that investors 
attach higher penalty in terms of risk premium for Conresigned firms facing higher information 
risk due to termination of political connection.  
 As reported in Panel B of 4 Table 5, no coefficient of significance is found for the 
term CORRUPT and the cross-term CORRUPT x AQ in post-Rule 18 period. The rationale 






This study addresses the economic consequences of the anti-corruption campaign 
in China from the perspective of information risk on impacted firms. Using AQ as an overall 
proxy for information risk, prior studies have decomposed AQ into innate and discretionary 
components. Evidence from studies on anti-corruption campaign has mixed implications on 
these components. On the one hand, termination of political connection signifies the end of 
preferential government treatments enjoyed by these firms, resulting in a more difficult 
operating environment. Management may also intentionally create an opaque reporting 
environment to avoid public or government scrutiny. In both cases, one would expect an 
increase in both AQ components. On the other hand, anti-corruption campaign helps to restore 
formal and efficient institutions and promote fair market competition, resulting in a stable 
operating environment with lower transaction costs. Moreover, management may exercise their 
discretion to choose accounting policies that produce a timely measure of firm performance. In 
both cases, one would expect lower AQ components.  
Empirically, we find that firms with terminated political connection due to the anti-
corruption campaign are associated with lower innate AQ than firms with no political 
connection. This finding is consistent with the proposition that anti-corruption campaign helps 
to curb rent-seeking activities. Further tests reveal that these impacted firms are also associated 
with a lower cost of equity in the post-campaign period. However, comparing with firms with 
no connection, investors attach a higher penalty in terms of risk premium to these impacted 






Summary Statistics for Sample Firms 
 Pre-Rule 18  Post-Rule 18 
 N Median Mean S.D.  N Median Mean S.D. 
Main Variables          
     IndEP 248 0.0032 0.0017 0.0369  328 -0.0043 -0.0033 0.0325 
     AQ-DD 246 0.0302 0.0442 0.0589  327 0.0244 0.0397 0.0502 
     AQ-FLOS 247 0.0287 0.0425 0.0567  327 0.0255 0.0373 0.0465 
     AQ-MJ 247 0.0958 0.1610 0.2221  328 0.0726 0.1504 0.3048 
     InnateAQ-DD 248 0.0476 0.0517 0.0363  328 0.0385 0.0457 0.0435 
     InnateAQ-FLOS 248 0.0490 0.0531 0.0379  328 0.0378 0.0452 0.0453 
     InnateAQ-MJ 247 0.2541 0.3183 0.2788  328 0.2039 0.2646 0.3288 
     AbDisAQ-DD 248 0.0233 0.0332 0.0432  327 0.0202 0.0297 0.0335 
     AbDisAQ-FLOS 248 0.0227 0.0321 0.0432  327 0.0208 0.0315 0.0351 
     AbDisAQ-MJ 248 0.1663 0.2318 0.2247  328 0.1426 0.2112 0.2576 
Control Variables          
     Innate factors           
     Size 248 22.2753 22.4303 1.3429  328 22.3493 22.5129 1.3506 
     OperCycle 248 4.8166 4.9105 1.1437  328 5.1816 5.1817 1.1887 
     NegEarn% 248 0.0000 0.0677 0.1403  328 0.0000 0.1050 0.1749 
     ϭ(CFO) 248 0.0603 0.0666 0.0430  328 0.0494 0.0614 0.0467 
     ϭ(Sales) 248 0.1328 0.1771 0.1534  328 0.0989 0.1419 0.1458 
     Financial          
     Beta 248 1.1374 1.1507 0.2532  328 1.0699 1.0293 0.2428 
     Leverage 248 0.1977 0.2126 0.1533  328 0.1734 0.1968 0.1614 
     ROA 248 0.0445 0.0574 0.0737  328 0.0300 0.0361 0.0735 
     Returns 248 -0.0013 -0.0021 0.0230  328 0.0014 0.0019 0.0341 
     MarketShare 248 0.0006 0.0017 0.0039  328 0.0004 0.0010 0.0017 
     Tangibility 248 0.3109 0.3433 0.1936  328 0.3468 0.3689 0.2116 
     GDPGrowth 248 12.4400 17.5056 5.5031  328 4.9900 6.7335 1.7676 
     FirmGrowth 248 0.1053 0.1878 0.3314  328 0.0687 0.2862 0.7035 
     ϭ(NI) 247 0.0251 0.0408 0.0623  327 0.0212 0.0370 0.0488 
     Governance          
     Analysts 248 8.0000 13.1884 13.1098  328 4.0000 7.6572 8.5056 
     InsiderHoldings 248 0.0000 0.8746 5.3502  328 0.0000 2.5135 9.4143 
     InstituteHoldings 248 6.765 8.4753 8.7300  328 5.5650 8.4500 9.7746 
     Listing 248 13.0000 12.8024 3.8088  328 15.0000 13.9207 5.5598 
     MajorHoldings 248 36.3100 38.5987 16.5038  328 35.6950 36.6961 15.9512 
     StateHoldings 248 0.0000 8.4590 17.2163  328 0.0000 4.4584 11.9199 
     Return Volatility          
     ϭ(Returns) 248 0.0237 0.0242 0.0045  328 0.0351 0.0356 0.0114 
     ϭ(Volume) 248 4.2710 6.9034 12.1790  328 8.7770 18.2670 24.0487 






Test of Median Differences between Pre- and Post-Rule 18 Periods 
 ConResigned Firms  Corrupt Firms  Non-Connected Firms 
 Pre-Rule 18  Post-Rule 18   Pre-Rule 18  Post-Rule 18   Pre-Rule 18  Post-Rule 18  
 N Median  N Median z  N Median  N Median z  N Median  N Median z 
Main Variables                     
   IndEP 102 -0.0003  141 -0.0061 0.965  21 -0.0146  25 -0.0038 -0.033  123 0.0050  159 -0.0014 1.640 
   AQ-DD 100 0.0315  141 0.0240 2.130 **  21 0.0414  25 0.0308 1.709 *  123 0.0270  158 0.0238 1.329 
   AQ-FLOS 101 0.0311  141 0.0253 2.237 **  21 0.0367  25 0.0296 0.761  123 0.0257  158 0.0232 1.706 * 
   AQ-MJ 102 0.0983  141 0.0728 2.905 ***  21 0.0825  25 0.0602 1.268  122 0.0966  159 0.0731 2.353 ** 
   InnateAQ-DD 102 0.0457  141 0.0343 2.204 **  21 0.0434  25 0.0519 0.739  123 0.0485  159 0.0431 1.595 
   InnateAQ-FLOS 102 0.0456  141 0.0323 2.319 **  21 0.0502  25 0.0488 0.981  123 0.0527  159 0.0411 1.999 ** 
   InnateAQ-MJ 101 0.0242  141 0.1746 1.941 *  21 0.0362  25 0.2259 1.555  123 0.0257  159 0.2273 1.803 * 
   AbDisAQ-DD 102 0.0214  141 0.0196 0.183  21 0.0329  25 0.0179 2.922 ***  123 0.0243  158 0.0219 0.587 
   AbDisAQ-FLOS 102 0.0174  141 0.0194 -0.954  21 0.0350  25 0.0170 2.106 **  123 0.0264  158 0.0232 0.022 
   AbDisAQ-MJ 102 0.1722  141 0.1180 1.603  21 0.2257  25 0.1312 1.158  123 0.1571  159 0.1554 0.250 
Innate Factors                     
   Size 102 22.2162  141 22.2010 -0.117  21 22.9198  25 22.6085 0.210  123 22.3193  159 22.4561 -1.671 * 
   OperCycle 102 4.8783  141 5.3650 -2.624 ***  21 4.8407  25 4.9185 -0.562  123 4.7626  159 4.9784 -1.467 
   NegEarn% 102 0.0000  141 0.0000 -0.602  21 0.0000  25 0.0000 -1.148  123 0.0000  159 0.0000 -2.859 *** 
   ϭ(CFO) 102 0.0637  141 0.0478 1.605  21 0.0619  25 0.0451 1.753 *  123 0.0568  159 0.0515 0.789 
   ϭ(Sales) 102 0.1293  141 0.0948 2.720 ***  21 0.1296  25 0.0964 1.158  123 0.1367  159 0.1027 2.785 *** 






Anti-Corruption Campaign and Information Risk 
Panel A: ConResigned vs Non-Connected Firms 
      
 AQ-FLOS  InnateAQ-FLOS  AbDisAQ-FLOS 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
CONRESIGN -0.1882  0.3273   0.3325  -1.0986 ***  0.4562  -0.0745  
 (-0.50)  (0.96)   (0.85)  (-3.09)   (0.79)  (-0.18)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Governance controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 203  281   204  282   204  281  
R2 0.5073  0.5170   0.4093  0.4546   0.2110  0.1521  
  
 AQ-DD  InnateAQ-DD  AbDisAQ-DD 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
CONRESIGN -0.4698  0.1582   0.2524  -1.1024 ***  0.5094  0.0809  
 (-1.32)  (0.47)   (0.63)  (-3.05)   (0.90)  (0.18)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Governance controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 202  281   204  282   204  281  
R2 0.5765  0.5524   0.4101  0.4533   0.1930  0.1436  
          
 AQ-MJ  InnateAQ-MJ  AbDisAQ-MJ 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
CONRESIGN 0.5043  0.1151   0.5556  -0.7395 *  0.8284  -0.8458 ** 
 (1.29)  (0.34)   (1.29)  (-1.87)   (1.58)  (-2.00)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Governance controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 203  282   203  282   204  282  
R2 0.4276  0.4709   0.2824  0.2412   0.2119  0.1149  





TABLE 3 (continued) 
Anti-Corruption Campaign and Information Risk 
Panel B: Corrupt vs Non-Connected Firms 
      
 AQ-FLOS  InnateAQ-FLOS  AbDisAQ-FLOS 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
CORRUPT 1.1948 ** 0.2504   1.3767 ** 0.6893   2.4307 ** -0.1294  
 (2.57)  (0.31)   (2.28)  (0.72)   (2.52)  (-0.15)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Governance controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 42  50   42  50   42  50  
R2 0.9173  0.7847   0.8734  0.6352   0.6740  0.5555  
  
 AQ-DD  InnateAQ-DD  AbDisAQ-DD 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
CORRUPT 0.9970  -0.0752   1.1611  0.8980   2.5276 ** -0.9749  
 (0.78)  (-0.13)   (1.62)  (0.92)   (2.10)  (-1.41)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Governance controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 42  50   42  50   42  50  
R2 0.8092  0.8408   0.8541  0.6428   0.7426  0.6783  
          
 AQ-MJ  InnateAQ-MJ  AbDisAQ-MJ 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
CORRUPT 0.1540  -0.1438   1.4778 * 1.2022   0.5849  0.5606  
 (0.13)  (-0.26)   (2.05)  (1.08)   (0.44)  (0.35)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Governance controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 42  50   42  50   42  50  
R2 0.8317  0.8700   0.7692  0.5660   0.6019  0.3775  






Anti-Corruption Campaign and Cost of Equity 
Panel A: ConResigned vs Non-Connected Firms 
 Dependent variable = IndEP 
AQ =  AQ-FLOS  InnateAQ-FLOS  AbDisAQ-FLOS 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
AQ 0.0008  -0.0017   0.0004  -0.0034 ***  0.0007  -0.0009  
 (0.66)  (-1.40)   (0.42)  (-2.73)   (0.86)  (-0.78)  
CONRESIGN -0.0019  -0.0131 **  -0.0233 ** -0.0111 *  -0.0071  -0.0078  
 (-0.23)  (-2.19)   (-2.00)  (-1.88)   (-0.96)  (-1.33)  
CONRESIGN x AQ -0.0011  0.0033 **  0.0024  0.0026 **  -0.0004  0.0020 * 
 (-0.62)  (2.53)   (1.43)  (2.43)   (-0.27)  (1.77)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 199  260   200  260   200  260  
R2 0.3976  0.3711   0.3229  0.2637   0.3034  0.2330  
  
 Dependent variable = IndEP 
AQ =  AQ-DD  InnateAQ-DD  AbDisAQ-DD 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
AQ 0.0003  -0.0023 *  0.0003  -0.0039 ***  -0.0001  0.0002  
 (0.27)  (-1.73)   (0.29)  (-3.27)   (-0.11)  (0.23)  
CONRESIGN -0.0064  -0.0140 **  -0.0234 ** -0.0133 **  -0.0068  0.0016  
 (-0.84)  (-2.33)   (-1.99)  (-2.43)   (-0.84)  (0.26)  
CONRESIGN x AQ -0.0002  0.0035 ***  0.0025  0.0031 ***  -0.0004  0.0002  
 (-0.13)  (2.63)   (1.42)  (2.93)   (-0.27)  (0.24)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 198  260   200  260   200  259  
R2 0.3943  0.3750   0.3219  0.2727   0.3026  0.2402  
          
 Dependent variable = IndEP 
AQ =  AQ-MJ  InnateAQ-MJ  AbDisAQ-MJ 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
AQ -0.0006  -0.0012   -0.0002  -0.0031 ***  0.0002  -0.0017  
 (-0.54)  (-1.18)   (-0.20)  (-2.82)   (0.28)  (-1.47)  
CONRESIGN -0.0194 ** -0.0072   -0.0264 ** -0.0104   -0.0198 * -0.0054  
 (-2.36)  (-1.13)   (-2.34)  (-1.57)   (-1.87)  (-0.73)  
CONRESIGN x AQ 0.0021  0.0021 **  0.0029 * 0.0024 **  0.0017  0.0015  
 (1.65)  (1.98)   (1.82)  (2.06)   (1.16)  (1.15)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 200  260   199  260   200  259  





TABLE 4 (continued) 
Anti-Corruption Campaign and Cost of Equity 
Panel B: Corrupt vs Non-Connected Firms 
 Dependent variable = IndEP 
AQ =  AQ-FLOS  InnateAQ-FLOS  AbDisAQ-FLOS 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
AQ -0.0033  0.0071   -0.0022  -0.0066 *  0.0002  0.0002  
 (-0.56)  (1.45)   (-0.26)  (-1.96)   (0.03)  (0.04)  
CORRUPT -0.0459  0.0173   0.0141  0.0023   0.0187  -0.0098  
 (-1.08)  (0.68)   (0.34)  (0.11)   (0.42)  (-0.28)  
CORRUPT x AQ 0.0093  -0.0028   -0.0043  0.0012   -0.0045  0.0044 * 
 (1.49)  (-0.57)   (-0.48)  (0.28)   (-0.61)  (0.73)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 42  54   42  54   42  54  
R2 0.6697  0.6347   0.3282  0.4663   0.3172  0.4251  
  
 Dependent variable = IndEP 
AQ =  AQ-DD  InnateAQ-DD  AbDisAQ-DD 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
AQ 0.0032  0.0035   -0.0010  -0.0086 **  0.0048  0.0044  
 (0.47)  (0.77)   (-0.12)  (-2.58)   (0.72)  (0.87)  
CORRUPT -0.0184  -0.0004   0.0166  -0.0020   0.0186  0.0124  
 (-0.45)  (-0.02)   (0.41)  (-0.11)   (0.38)  (0.31)  
CORRUPT x AQ 0.0040  0.0004   -0.0049  0.0021   -0.0046  0.0010  
 (0.71)  (0.08)   (-0.56)  (0.56)   (-0.62)  (0.17)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 42  54   42  54   42  54  
R2 0.6697  0.6347   0.3282  0.4663   0.3172  0.4251  
          
 Dependent variable = IndEP 
AQ =  AQ-MJ  InnateAQ-DD  AbDisAQ-DD 
 Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post 
AQ 0.0143 ** 0.0059   -0.0015  -0.0015   0.0098  0.0012  
 (2.73)  (1.26)   (-0.16)  (-0.39)   (1.00)  (0.38)  
CORRUPT 0.0171  -0.0074   -0.0097  0.0296   0.0770  0.0440  
 (0.50)  (-0.40)   (-0.15)  (0.98)   (1.16)  (1.57)  
CORRUPT x AQ 0.0037  0.0020   0.0003  -0.0034   -0.0143  -0.0063  
 (0.70)  (0.48)   (0.03)  (-0.67)   (-1.24)  (-1.26)  
Innate controls Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No  
Financial controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Return volatility controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 42  54   42  54   42  54  
R2 0.7075  0.6366   0.3055  0.4345   0.3514  0.4392  
*, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Refer to Appendix A 






ϭ(CFO) Standard deviation of firm j’s cash flow from operations for the past 5 years 
ϭ(Sales) Standard deviation of firm j’s sales for the past 5 years 
ϭ(NI) Standard deviation of firm j’s net income for the past 5 years 
ϭ(Returns) Standard deviation of firm j’s daily returns over all trading days of the fiscal year 
ϭ(Volume) Standard deviation of firm j’s daily trading volume over all trading days of the fiscal year 
AbDisAQ-DD Discretionary component of firm j’s accrual quality under the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
AbDisAQ-FLOS Discretionary component of firm j’s accrual quality under the Francis et al. (2005) model 
AbDisAQ-MJ Discretionary component of firm j’s accrual quality under the Modified-Jones model 
Analysts Number of analyst following 
AQ-DD Firm j’s accrual quality under the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
AQ-FLOS Firm j’s accrual quality under the Francis et al. (2005) model 
AQ-MJ Firm j’s accrual quality under the Modified-Jones model 
Beta Annual estimate of Firm j’s beta from the market model of its daily returns with value-weight daily market returns 
CONRESIGN An indicator variable that equals one for firms with all connected-officials resigned due to Rule-18 
CORRUPT An indicator variable that equals one for firms with officers involved in corruption cases in the post-Rule 18 period 
FirmGrowth Log of 1 + % change in firm j’s book value of equity 
GDPGrowth Year-to-year % change in gross domestic product of China 
IndEP Firm j’s earnings-price ratio less the median earnings-price ratio of firm j’s industry 
InnateAQ-DD Innate component of firm j’s accrual quality under the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
InnateAQ-FLOS Innate component of firm j’s accrual quality under the Francis et al. (2005) model 
InnateAQ-MJ Innate component of firm j’s accrual quality under the Modified-Jones model 
InsiderHoldings Firm j’s shares held by managers divided by firm j’s total shares outstanding 
InstituteHoldings Firm j’s shares held by institutional investors divided by firm j’s total shares outstanding 
Leverage Firm j’s ratio of interest-bearing debt to total assets  
Listing Number of years that firm j has listed on the exchange 
MajorHoldings Firm j’s shares held by largest shareholder divided by firm j’s total shares outstanding 
MarketShare Firm j’s sales divided by total sales of firm j’s industry 




APPENDIX A (continued) 
Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
OperCycle Log of (360 / (Firm j’s Sales / Firm j’s average AR) + 360 / (Firm j’s Cost of Goods Sold) / (Firm j’s Average Inventory)) 
Returns Firm j’s annual stock return 
ROA Firm j’s net income divided by the average total asset 
Size Log of firm j’s total assets 
StateHoldings Number of firm j’s shares held by government agencies divided by firm j’s total shares outstanding 






Models of Accruals Quality 
Variables Definitions 
AQ-FLOSj,t Standard deviation of firm j’s residuals over years t–4 through t from annual 
regressions with estimated coefficients of the following annual firm-specific 
model benchmarked with 50 firms with similar total assets values in year t: 
 
TCAj,t = ϕ0 + ϕ1 CFOj,t-1 + ϕ2 CFOj,t + ϕ3 CFOj,t+1 
+ ϕ4 ∆Revj,t + ϕ5 PPEj,t + υj,t, 
(5) 
where TCAj,t = ∆CAj,t – ∆CLj,t – ∆Cashj,t + STDEBTj,t = total current accruals 
in year t, CFOj,t = NIBEj,t – TAj,t = firm j’s cash flow from operations in year 
t, NIBEj,t = firm j’s net income before extraordinary items in year t, TAj,t = 
(∆CAj,t – ∆CLj,t – ∆Cashj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t – DEPNj,t) = firm j’s total accruals 
in year t, ∆CAj,t = firm j’s change in current assets between year t–1 and year 
t, ∆CLj,t = firm j’s change in current liabilities between year t–1 and year t, 
∆Cashj,t = firm j’s change in cash between year t–1 and year t, ∆STDEBTj,t = 
firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t–1 and year t, 
DEPNj,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense in year t, ∆Revj,t = 
firm j’s change in revenues between year t–1 and year t, PPEj,t = firm j’s gross 
value of property, plant and equipment in year t. Larger standard deviations 
of residuals indicate poorer accruals quality. 
 
AQ-DDj,t Standard deviation of firm j’s residuals over years t–4 through t from annual 
regressions with estimated coefficients of the following annual firm-specific 
model benchmarked with 50 firms with similar total assets values in year t: 
 ∆WCj,t = γ0 + γ1 CFOj,t-1 + γ2 CFOj,t + γ3 CFOj,t+1 + εt, (6) 
where ∆WCj,t = ∆ARj,t + ∆Inventoryj,t – ∆APj,t – ∆TPj,t + ∆Other Assets (net) 
= change in firm j’s working capital between year t–1 and year t, CFOj,t = 
firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t, ∆ARj,t = change in firm j’s account 
receivable between year t–1 and year t, ∆Inventoryj,t = change in firm j’s 
inventory between year t–1 and year t, ∆APj,t = change in firm j’s account 
payable between year t–1 and year t, ∆TPj,t = change in firm j’s taxes payable 
between year t–1 and year t. All variables are scaled by average assets. Larger 
standard deviations of residuals indicate poorer accruals quality. 
 
AQ-MJj,t Standard deviation of firm j’s residuals over years t–4 through t from annual 
regressions with estimated coefficients of the following annual firm-specific 
model benchmarked with 50 firms with similar total assets values in year t: 
 TAj,t = φ0 + φ1 (1/A j,t-1) + φ2 (∆REVj,t - ∆RECj,t) + φ3 PPEj,t + εt, (7) 
where TAj,t = firm j’s total accruals for year t, measured as the difference 
between net profit and operating cash flows; A j,t-1 = firm j’s total assets for 
year t-1; ∆REVj,t = change in firm j’s revenues from year t-1 to year t;  ∆RECj,t  
= change in firm j’s receivables from year t-1 to year t; PPEj,t = firm j’s gross 
property, plant and equipment in year t. Larger standard deviations of 




APPENDIX B (continued) 








Predicted values from the following model with fitted annual estimates of 
coefficients under various AQ models (FLOS, DD and MJ): 
  
AQj,t = λ0 + λ1 Sizej,t + λ2 ϭ(CFO)j,t + λ3 ϭ(Sales)j,t  
+ λ4 OperCyclej,t + λ5 NegEarn%j,t + μj,t, 
(8) 
where Sizej,t = log of firm j’s total assets for year t; ϭ(CFO)j,t = standard 
deviation of firm j’s cash flow from operations between year t–4 and year t; 
ϭ(Sales)j,t = standard deviation of firm j’s sales between year t–4 and year t; 
OperCyclej,t = log of firm j’s operating cycle; NegEarn%j,t = percentage of 









Residual from (8) with fitted annual estimates of coefficients under various 
AQ models (FLOS, DD and MJ): 
 








Logit Models for Propensity Score Matching 
 ConResigned Firms   Corrupt Firms 
 vs Non-Connected Firms   vs Non-Connected Firms 
 Coefficient Z   Coefficient Z 
ϭ(CFO) 0.3916 -0.64   2.5951 0.31 
ϭ(Sales) 1.2139 0.43   0.8907 -0.12 
ϭ(Volume) 1.0112 ** 2.39   1.0156 ** 2.02 
ϭ(Returns) 0.0137 -0.62   3,076.643 0.52 
Size 0.8845 *** -3.87   0.8213 *** -2.85 
OperCycle 0.9238 -1.08   0.6651 *** -2.72 
Beta 1.1608 0.61   0.3644 * -1.74 
Leverage 1.9037 1.59   0.1427 * -1.95 
Tangibility 0.4552 ** -2.18   0.3545 -1.40 
Firm-Growth 1.0707 0.77   0.7405 -1.41 
ROA 0.9116 -0.10   0.0097 * -1.88 
Book-to-market 1.0943 0.47   2.8416 *** 4.01 
InstituteHoldings 1.0314 *** 3.72   0.9382 * -1.79 
InsiderHoldings 0.9624 *** -4.45   1.0164 0.91 
MajorHoldings 1.0088 ** 2.21   1.0007 0.08 
StateHoldings 1.0005 0.13   0.9995 -0.06 
Analysts 1.0144 * 1.82   1.0475 *** 3.11 
Listing 0.9895 -0.83   1.1896 *** 4.98 
Returns 0.1220 -1.13   0.0011 * -1.66 
GDP-Growth 0.9944 -0.69   1.0344 * 1.72 
Industry effects Yes    Yes  
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